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NOTES AND COMMENT
PRIORITIES BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE ASSIGNEES OF THE SAME CHOSE
IN AcTIoN.*
At the outset, a brief survey of the rights of an assignee as
against the assignor will not be amiss. Where a right or claim has
been assigned and the transfer is complete, the assignee becomes
the owner and the party in interest by succession to the obligee's
rights. The assignor is divested of every vestige of ownership,
i. e., the aggregate of the legal rights, privileges, powers and im-
munities, and a similar bundle of rights is invested in the assignee.1
After the transfer, the assignee is recognized as the real party in
interest and the promisee can exercise no more power over it than
a stranger. Any acts of his affecting the validity of the contract
are fraudulent.
2
When good faith permeates the transfer and the rights of a
third person are not involved, no consideration is required to con-
vey the obligor's duty to the assignee.
3
Since the assignor by a transfer of the entire claim conveys
the ownership in it and the assignee takes it subject to collateral
equities 4 the subsequent assignee takes nothing by the purported
assignment. The original owner can not convey anything when he
* This Note is confined to a consideration of intangible choses not related
to the Negotiable Instrument Law or the Recording Acts.
'Hopkins v. Banks, 7 Cow. 650 (N. Y. 1827); Whiting v. Glass, 217 N. Y.
333, 111 N. E. 1082 (1916); Klein-Messner Co. v. The Fair Waist & Dress
Co., Inc., 221 App. Div. 725, 224 N. Y. Supp. 511 (1st Dept. 1927) ; Cook, The
Alienability of Choses in Action (1916) 29 HARV. L. REv. 816, 820; Cook,
The Alienability of Choses in Action (1917) 30 HARV. L. REv. 449, 469.
2 Klein-Messner Co. v. The Fair Waist & Dress Co., Inc., ibid.; Cook, The
Alienability of Choses in Action, ibid. at 829.
'Klein-Messner Co. v. The Fair Waist & Dress Co., Inc., ibid. In this
case the assignor sued the debtor to recover the purchase price of goods sold,
after it notified obligor, defendant, of the assignment of the claim to a third
person. It was held that plaintiff to maintain the action must have the legal
title or an equitable interest. At 726, N. Y. Supp. at 513, the court said:
"The consideration paid, the purpose of the assignment, the use to be made of
any proceeds is immaterial."
Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, supra note 1 at 821 and 822.
At the common law the assignments of non-negotiable choses were never recog-
nized because of champerty and maintenance. In the fifteenth century equity gave
effect to them by the in personamn procedure against the assignor. Equity
treated the assignor as trustee, then later the assignee was held out as pos-
sessing a power of attorney to evade the illegality of the assignment at common
law. The assignee's right, being an equity, he takes the assignment subject to
all equities against the assignor.
WILLISTON, WORD "EQUITABLE" (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 822. Although
the assignee is now allowed to sue in his own name, he is not exempt from the
rule that the assignment is subject to defenses and offsets. WILLISTON, IS THE
RIGHT OF AN ASSIGNEE OF A CHOSE IN AcrION LEGAL OR EQUITABLE? (1916)
30 HARV. L. REV. 97, 105. The rights of the assignee are nevertheless equitable.
The effect of the statutes-§210 C. P. A. (Real party in interest must main-
tain the action at law). Section 211 C. P. A. Partial assignee of a present
claim may enforce his right at law-is procedural only and the substantial
rights are not changed. See also N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §41.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
retained nothing in his possession. Hence, the principle may be
deduced that between conflicting assignments of the same chose,
whether legal or equitable, the one prior in time will prevail. This
doctrine is in accord with reason and not at variance with the de-
cisions of this state. 5 That an assignee took the chose free from the
latent equities of third persons was the rule in the early nineteenth
century. 6 But it had been overruled shortly thereafter and never
followed in subsequent cases.7
A prior claimant is not estopped from setting aside or in-
validating an assignment on equitable grounds though the subse-
quent assignee was a bona fide purchaser relying upon a writing.,
What are the respective rights of successive bona fide pur-
chasers for value the second of whom has acquired the legal title?
This precise question has not, as yet, been decided by the court of
last resort in this state. It has not been confronted with a case
containing facts calling for such a determination. But in an out-
standing case, Fairbanks v. Sargent,9 where the plaintiff was the par-
tial assignee of a future claim and the defendant was the later
assignee of the entire claim, Finch, J., delivering the opinion of the
court, by obiter dicta, conceded, in response to defendant's con-
tention, that if Sargent had obtained the legal title before Fair-
banks, a superiority would have been conferred upon him (Sargent).
As was pointed out by the judge in a comprehensive decision, Fair-
banks had the prior legal possession as well as the superior equity.
Underwood, the assignor, had never relinquished his claim against
the debtor. When the bonds came into the obligee's possession,
' Muir v. Schenck, et al., 3 Hill 228 (N. Y. 1842); Bush v. Lathrop, 22
N. Y. 535 (1860) ; the second assignee takes subject to the interest between the
assignor and first assignee. Greentree v. Rosenstock, 61 N. Y. 583 (1875);
Williams, et al. v. Ingersoll, et al., 89 N. Y. 508 (1882) ; Fairbanks v. Sargent,
117 N. Y. 320, 22 N. E. 1039 (1889); Fortunato v. Patten, 147 N. Y. 277,
41 N. E. 572 (1895) ; the purchase of a chose confers no greater right on an
assignee than the assignor possessed; Central Trust Co. of N. Y. v. The
West India Improvement Co., et al., 169 N. Y. 314, 62 N. E. 387 (1901);
between two conflicting equitable liens, other things being equal, protection is
afforded to the one prior in time; Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum, 214
App. Div. 525, 527, 212 N. Y. Supp. 473, 475 (1st Dept. 1925): "A subsequent
assignee takes nothing by his assignment, because the assignor has nothing
to give."
Murray et al. v. Lyburn, et al., 2 Johns. 441 (N. Y. 1817) ; Livingston v.
Dean, et al., 2 Johns. 479 (N. Y. 1817) ; the assignee not affected by stranger's
equity of which he has no notice.
'Bush v. Lathrop, supra note 5; Cutts v. Guild, 57 N. Y. 229 (1817); the
bona fide purchaser from assignee takes subject to the equities between the
former assignor and assignee; Owen v. Evans, 134 N. Y. 514, 31 N. E. 999
(1892); no distinction between equities existing in favor of debtor and those
of third person; Central Trust Co. of N. Y. v. The West India Improvement
Co., supra note 5; Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum, .spra note 5.
'Central Trust Co. v. The West India Improvement Co., supra note 5; no
consideration was given at the time of the assignment; Owen v. Evans, ibid.
*Supra note 5.
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Fairbanks' legal title immediately attached to his share. The view
entertained in this case is not supported in subsequent decisions. In
Central Trust Co. v. West India Improvement Co.,10 the same tri-
bunal, through Judge Cullen, citing Fairbanks v. Sargent, stated that
it was not decisive and conclusive as to the subsequent assignee's
superiority, as he did not part with present consideration. Past in-
debtedness does not make the assignee a bona fide purchaser for value.
The same principle is applicable to partial assignments. A frac-
tional transfer of a chose takes precedence over a later total assign-
ment of the same claim. If the previous transfer assigns a portion of
the debt owing and the original creditor in fraud of the first assignee's
rights attempts to make an effective transfer of the entire indebt-
edness, the subsequent assignment is cancelled pro tanto.1  The as-
signor of his own volition cannot alter or vary the rights of the
first assignee.' 2
The rule is qualified to the extent that the second transferee
prevails to the exclusion of the first, if the prior assignment is void-
able or revocable by the assignor or the principle of estoppel may
be invoked.13
If the subsequent assignee, a bona fide purchaser for value, all
other things being equal, secures payment or satisfaction, he cannot
retain what he has received. The proceeds are held in trust for the
10 Ibid.
"Fairbanks v. Sargent, supra note 5; Central Trust Co. v. The West India
Improvement Co., supra note 5; Hinkle Iron Co. v. Kohn, 229 N. Y. 179, 128
N. E. 113 (1920) ; Porter v. Lane Construction Corp., 212 App. Div. 528, 209
N. Y. Supp. 54 (4th Dept. 1925), aff'd, 244 N. Y. 523, 155 N. E. 881 (1926);
WILLISTON, Is THE RIGHT OF AN ASSIGNEE OF A CHOSE IN ACTION LEGAL OR
EQUITABLE? supra note 5 at 107-108.
" Williams v. Ingersoll, supra note 5; Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum,
supra note 5, N. Y. Supp. at 476, "* * * he (assignor) has no right to collect or
compromise the chose, nor in any way to discharge the debtor therefrom, nor to
modify the chose, as by an extension of time to the debtor. If thereafter the
assignor does collect the chose, the money in his hands arising therefrom will
be held as trust funds belonging to the assignee * * *.'
" Bush v. Lathrop, supra note 5, cf. Coates v. First Nat'l Bank, 91 N. Y.
20 (1883) (Plaintiff, a volunteer, did not succeed); Fairbanks v. Sargent,
supra note 5 at 330, N. E. at 1040; Owen v. Evans, mpra note 7; Central Trust
Co. v. The West India Improvement Co., mpra note 5, 323, N. E. at 390,
"** * between two conflicting interests or liens, other things being equal, the
one that is prior in time is superior in right * * *." Ferndon v. Canfield, 39
Hun 571 (1886), aff'd, 104 N. Y. 143, 10 N. E. 146 (1887) ; Weeks v. City of
New York, 42 Misc. 436, 87 N. Y. Supp. 98 (1904) ; Erie R. R. Co. v. Smith,
et al., 68 Misc. 136, 123 N. Y. Supp. 973 (1910), aff'd, 144 App. Div. 911, 128
N. Y. Supp. 1122 (2d Dept. 1911); Selwyn & Co. v. Waller, 212 N. Y. 507, 106
N. E. 321 (1914). Illustrations: Bradley v. Root, 5 Paige 632, 640 (N. Y.
1836), additional responsibility must be assumed or security given upon faith
of new assignment. If A sells to B for past consideration and C takes a later
assignment without notice for present value, C will prevail. Again, if B and C
are volunteers and C obtains payment or satisfaction, he prevails and invali-
dates B's.
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first purchaser.' 4  Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum '" is the
first and only New York case, in which the rights of a subsequent bona
fide purchaser for value who reduced the claim to legal possession
first, are adjudged. The facts were as follows: the obligee assigned
the same accounts for value first to the plaintiff and then to the
defendant. Both took without notice. The defendant collected the
same and converted the proceeds to his own use and purpose. It
was there held, the defendant acquired no interest under the assign-
ment as it was void. The proceeds were held in trust for the plaintiff.
The same principle would seem to apply where a judgment or
new obligation was secured by the junior assignee from the obligor.,6
Priority of notice does not destroy the superiority of the as-
signment earlier in time. The first of successive transferees is not
compelled to do any further act to be protected, i. e., it is not essen-
tial to a valid disposition of the claim that the obligor should be
apprised of it. The previous transfer, being the prior equity, will
prevail. 17 In Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum,18 the court quoted
verbatim, from a case cited for an authority, as follows: "It seems
"4 Fairbanks v. Sargent, su~pra note 5; Central Trust Co. v. The West India
Improvement Co., supra note 5 at 323 N. E. 390; "* * * that between two con-
flicting interests or liens, other things being equal, the one that is prior in time
is superior in right. It is further the settled law of this state, though a different
rule prevails not only in England, but in the Federal Courts and in some of the
states, that a bona fide purchaser for value of a chose in action takes it subject
not only to the equities in favor of third persons * * *." (Pltf., senior assignee,
prevailed as he had the equitable as well as the superior title. Defendant paid
no new consideration. Obligated to pay over money received.)
'
5 Supra note 5.
"
0Ibid. at 527, N. Y. Supp. at 475; "* * * and so a judgment thereafter
recovered by the assignor against the debtor will be for the use of the assignee."
It is reasonable to deduce that a subsequent assignee cannot retain benefits if
assignor is unable (Klein-Messner Co. v. The Fair Waist & Dress Co., Inc.,
supra note 1). Assignee has no greater rights than his immediate assignor.
The assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor (Bush v. Lathrop, .supra
note 5). Debtor's promise to pay the second, fails by reason of a prior assign-
ment. No consideration for the promise (Muir v. Schenck, supra note 5).
'Note (1924) 24 Col- L. Rav. 501 (Notice as determining the rights of
successive assignees) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1924) §435 (Notice affecting
the mutual rights of successive assignees) ; Fortunato v. Patten, stpra note 5.
Provision in the contract between assignor and debtor to the effect that
if an assignment is made without the debtor's consent, no right -under
the contract can be asserted against it. The first assignment was to the defen-
dant without debtor's consent, second to a bank with consent. Held, Defen-
dant prevailed; assignee only obliged to notify defendant if he sought to sue
debtor. Yorke v. Conde, 20 N. Y. Supp. 961 (1892) ; Hannah v. Lichtenhein,
182 App. Div. 94, 169 N. Y. Supp. 589 (1st Dept. 1918). As between different
assignees of a chose by express agreement from the same person, the one prior
in time prevails though no notice of assignment was given to the subsequent
assignee or debtor. Reynolds v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 208 App. Div.
556, 203 N. Y. Supp. 851 (2d Dept. 1924), aff'g, 120 Misc. 561, 200 N. Y.
Supp. 105 (1923) ; Muir v. Schenck, supra note 5 at 231. "Between assignor




to us that the better reasons are against such a rule. By the first
assignment the rights of the assignor pass to the assignee. The
creditor has a right to dispose of his own property as he chooses
and to require the debt to be paid as he directs without the assent
of the debtor. * * * Failure of the first to give notice does not divest
him of any title or right, or vest any claim in a subsequent pur-
chaser. * * * It is impossible to eliminate all risk from such a
transaction."
A senior assignee is not even required to give notice to the
obligor to prevent bona fide creditors of the assignor from acquiring
a valid lien on the chose attaching after the assignment. 19
Although no notice is necessary so far as title is concerned it
is advisable to give it. Notification reserves to the assignee the right
to assert the claim against the debtor; it puts the debtor on guard
against dealing with the assignor on the belief he is the owner. If
prior to apprisal, the obligor makes payment to the obligee, secures
a release or acquires any defense or set-off against the assignor, he
may set it up against the assignee. 20  This is sound as it would be
inequitable to compel the promisor to pay twice. He is not a trustee
until notice is given. If he is sued as the debtor he is entitled to
pay the first who presents the claim. But if the obligor, at the time
of the payment to the second was aware of the existing prior trans-
fer, he is not immune from further liability.21
The views expressed by the decisions herein are sound for so-
cial and economic reasons. Writers of repute and distinction 22 ap-
prove of them. If the Court of Appeals sanctions the rule expressed
in the Brassiere case, both lawyer and student will willingly follow it.
PHILIP A. LIMPERT.
"Columbia Bank v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U. S., 61
App. Div. 594, 70 N. Y. Supp. 767 (1st Dept. 1901).
' Field v. Mayor, 6 N. Y. 179 (1852) ; Herman v. Ellsworth, 64 N. Y. 159
(1876); Wood v. Mayor, 73 N. Y. 556 (1878), debtor allowed to set off
against the assignee claims that matured at time of assignment and those that
existed prior to notice; Yorke v. Conde, supra note 17; Heiliger v. Ritter et al.,
78 Misc. 264, 138 N. Y. Supp. 212 (1912) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTs (1920)
supra note 18, §433; Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, supra note 2.
"Carnegie Trust Co. v. Battery Place Realty Co., 67 Misc. 452 (1910);
Hannah v. Lichtenhein, supra note 17; Reynolds v. Title G. & T. Co., supra
note 17; WILLISTON, ibid.
Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, supra note 1 at 836: *** be-
cause of the historical origin of the doctrine, with its beginnings in equity, as
well as because of certain notions of policy, the equitable doctrine which protects
bona fide purchasers for value has not been extended to cover this form of
property which became alienable only in modern times."
WILLISTON, IS THE RIGHT OF AN ASSIGNEE OF A CHOSE Ix ACTION LEGAl,
OR EQUITABLE? supra note 4 at 107: " * * * it is thought unfair to subject the
assignee to equities which he is unable to discover. On the other hand, it is to
be observed that intangible choses in action are not primarily intended for
merchandising, as chattels are."
Id. at 108: "On the whole, therefore, it seems to me that the system
worked out by the courts during several centuries, coupled with a statutory
change in procedure allowing the assignee to sue in his own name, produces the
most desirable results and best fits in place with other rules of our legal
system."
